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GENERAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.
Instiiuts Solvay. Institut de Sociologie. Notes et Memoires. Li-
brairie Misch & Thron, Brussels.
1. Note sur les formules d'introduction a V energetique physio- et
psycho-sociologique. E. SOLVAY. 1906. Pp. 24. Fr. 2.
2. JSsquisse d'une sociologie. E. WAXWEILER. 1906. Pp. 306.
Fr. 12.
3. Les origines naturelles de la propriete. R. PETRUCCI. 1905.
Pp. 246. Fr. i s .
4. Sur quelques erreurs de methode dans Vetude de Vhomme prim-
itif. L. WODON. 1906. Pp. 37. Fr. 2.50.
5. L'Aryen et Vanthroposociologie. E. HOUZE. 1906. Pp. 177.
Fr. 6.
6. Mesure des capacites intellectuelle et energetique. C H . HENRY.
Avec une remarque additionnelle: Sur I'interprStation sociol-
ogique de la distribution des salaires. E. WAXWEILER. 1906.
Pp. 75. Fr. 4.
7. Origine polyphyletique, homotypie, et non-cotnparabilite des
societe's animates. R. PETRUCCI. 1006. Pp. 126. Fr. 5.
The Solvay Institut de Sociologie, founded in 1902 by M. Ernest
Solvay and situated in Brussels, puts forward the above evidences of
vigorous production by the Director, Emile Waxweiler, his collabo-
rators, and others. Several of the various monographs have a certain
community of point of view. The effort is made to relate social phe-
nomena in man to corresponding phases of animal life, and in method
to find at least a starting point in general biological conceptions. The
first brochure, by M. Solvay, founder of the institute, is however of
a mathematical character.
The numbers which are of interest from the standpoint of social
psychology are (2), (3), (4) and (7).
In (2), Esquisse d'une Sociologies the author finds his point of
view in the conception of Ethology. This term is taken, not in Mill's
sense of science of character, but in the sense for which the term
Ecology is also employed, to designate a study of organisms in rela-
tion to environment. Disregarding the relation of the individual to his
cosmic environment, the sociologist notes among the relations to the
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living environment those involved in the facts of species. These
facts may be considered as including a threefold specific affinity: sex-
ual, which implies fecundity limited by the species; vegetative, which
determines the relations of cells derived by auto-division from another
cell, whether these form cell-colonies or a single organism; and
social, which leads the individual to establish relations with others in
which it finds similarity of organization. Specific affinity may be
defined as ' a particular aspect of the physical sensibility, which renders
it susceptible of responding, in determinate conditions, to excitation
from the other individuals of the same species.' Social affinity will
be such a sensibility as ' renders an organism susceptible to the exci-
tations of other individuals of the same species without distinction of
sex,' and this is the fundamental fact for sociology. This is similar
to the ' like response' which Giddings makes the basis for the ' con-
sciousness of kind, ' but the author regards it as more fundamental,
since it might exist without there necessarily being a like response.
It has also the decided advantage that it centers emphasis upon the
interdependent relation rather than upon a perception of similarity.
Sociology may then be called " the science of the phenomena of reac-
tion due to the mutual excitation of individuals of the same species
without distinction of sex."
The analysis of these phenomena of social affinity which occupies
the larger part of the volume is sketched in outline, rather than worked
out in detail, and seems hardly as fruitful as the central conception
would lead the reader to expect.
In the third monograph M. Petrucci has given a very instructive
study of the relation of property to the individual and to the group —
family, clan, or people. Instead of the abstract discussions often
found as to private or group ownership, we have an effort to relate
forms of property to biological and psychological conditions. I t is
thus in some respects correlative to the admirable study made some
years ago by Grosse of the relation of the various forms of the family
to economical and industrial conditions.
Premising that individual and collective possession have their roots
in the two fundamental sets of instincts, those for individual needs of
support, attack, defense and protection, and those for the maintenance
of the species and its interests, the author is led to examine the sub-
human manifestations of these instincts and the forms of possession, if
not of property in the full legal and moral sense, which arise from
them. Even plants show the two forces at work in their methods of
exploiting the soil and storing nutritive reserves. Mollusks and worms
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show predominantly individual types; the corals, however, afford an
interesting example of colonial structure, with individual tubes, joined
by transverse supports. Insects, of course, furnish in the ants and bees
the extreme evolution of collective property where certain members
are employed as store-houses for nutriment. Birds with their family
life have in their nest a family property, although the social species in
their exploited territory assert a collective rather than an individual or
family control, and some of them in their nesting colonies have rather
group than family nests. And on the other hand, in some species
individuals have their own permanent dwellings. The three types,
individual, family, and group property, are thus all foreshadowed in bird
life, and mammals repeat these three types with various degrees of
emphasis.
The principal factor which marks property among primitive man,
as in any way distinct from the animal types, is the making and use
of permanent tools and arms and clothing. These maintain their indi-
vidual character. Family property is more likely to appear in the
dwelling, and group or collective property in the territory exploited,
although we find here also collective property in dwellings, and on the
other hand in some cases families exploiting each its own territory.
No such extreme of collectivism as that among the hymenoptera appears
in human societies.
The analogies found show therefore that the social fact (in this case,
the fact of property) is not bound up with the biological evolution in
such a way that the biological perfecting gives at the same time the
social laws (p. 218). The phenomena of property may be summar-
ized in the following six principles : (1) Property appears as a phe-
nomenon attaching to the first manifestations of life. (2) It is at first
the expression of an individual structure and an adaptation. It takes
(3) the individual form when it is determined by the biological law of
the protection of the individual; (4) the family form when determined
by the law of protection of the species, realized on the basis of the sex
instinct; (5) the collective form when determined by the law of pro-
tection of the species, realized by the phenomena of association, con-
sidered generally and abstracting from the family group. (6) The
individual, family and collective forms of property are specifically dis-
tinct, and are characterized respectively, (a) by reflecting the proper
structure and activities of the animal considered in isolation; (£) by
the predominance of the associative tendency limited by the parental
group, (c) by the unrestricted predominance of the associative ten-
dency. An excellent chart shows the facts with reference to the three
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kinds of property in the three cases of food reserves, exploitation of
territory, shelter and dwelling.
The ' errors of method in the study of primitive man,' to which
M. Wodon's discussion is devoted, are those committed in the author's
opinion by Karl Bucher. The doctrine of a non-industrial and non-
economic primitive condition, the doctrine of the differentiation of the
work of the sexes, and the view that play and art precede serious pro-
duction are criticized. The postulate that dispositions or modes of
conduct which do not harmonize with the conditions of life at a given
stage may be regarded as survivals of a previous stage and therefore
used as data from which to construct that previous stage, is easily
shown to be unsound. There is not, however, an adequately supported
discussion of the views presented in opposition to those of Bucher.
In the seventh number of the series M. Petrucci examines the
various types of social life among animals with the purpose of discover-
ing (1) whether these forms can be regarded as forming a linear series
of development, corresponding in evolution to the biological ' higher '
and ' l ower ' ; (2) how much of the human social instinct maybe
regarded as hereditary. These questions involve, moreover, (3) some
suggestive queries as to how far certain peculiarities of human societies
found in tabus, in totem groups, in separation of groups of unmarried
males, etc., are really as purely instinctive and without rational expla-
nation for their origin as are the corresponding phenomena among
animals.
The conclusions under (1) and (2) may be briefly stated. The
social forms of animal life cannot be arranged in a serial order of lower
and higher corresponding to biological development; they are of poly-
phyletic origin. The successive appearance of similar forms is homo-
typic, not hereditary. The only hereditary factor is the tendency to
group. But this takes on the form of maternal societies, or of paternal
groups, of polygamous or monogamous groups, of flocks or colonies,
not by any single serial law, but under the stimuli of varying circum-
stances, such as those of supply, defense, migration, or mating, and
the care of young.
Some of the problems suggested under (3) are the following : We
find among primitive peoples such facts as the separation of the ado-
lescent into classes or groups apart from the families, or again the
separation of males and females into distinct bands. These phenomena
are found also among various animals. Woman in pregnancy is fre-
quently regarded as unclean, and is among some peoples isolated. The
isolation of females at the season of pregnancy is observed among rumi-
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nants and birds. The aged females occupy a dominant position in
many animal and human societies. We cannot say that these specific
customs are inherited by man from the animal species which have them.
The instances that crop out along various branches of the biological
tree are not found in a consecutive line. But, on the other hand, does
not the homotypy suggest strongly a similar cause? It wears now
among human societies the appearance of religious custom. " The
truth is that with man, as with the animal, the fact may depend on
many other causes. The explanations given are constructed after the
phenomena; they should be rejected. I confess, for my part, that the
real cause remains for me unknown. I do not even see how investi-
gation should be directed in order to discuss it." In the case of aesthetic
phenomena the author draws a conclusion adverse to their alleged social
origin. The bird decorates the bower; the primitive man decorates
his cave with shining objects or gathers a store of bright stones. Some-
times this serves sexual ends, sometimes it merely affords pleasant
sensations. " The aesthetic phenomenon is in nowise social in its
origins; like property it is a something brought by the individual
animal to the group to which he joins himself as integrant part. It
becomes social with him; it is not such by its proper nature or by its
origins." On this three comments may be made, ( i ) M. Petrucci
draws very sweeping inductions from data in a single art. Song,
music, dance, myth, story, are not reckoned with. (2) Few if any
advocates of the social origin of art would wish to maintain this in a
sense that excludes sex relationship from social factors. (3) What
the present writer, for example, has maintained is, not that man as
individual has not sensations pleasantly stimulated by color, sound,
smell, and touch, nor that he does not adorn his person to provoke the
passions of sex. It is rather that the detachment and the objectivity
characteristic of the aesthetic, as compared with appetite and passion,
is strongly aided if not entirely caused by the social as versus the indi-
vidual attitude; and further that in the profounder esthetic conscious-
ness the idea of expression, of communication, of sharing, is an im-
portant factor. J . H. T.
Uechange economique et Vechange affectif. F . PAULHAN. Revue
Philosophique, 1906, LXII., 358—399.
The chief difference, as found by the author, between the eco-
nomic exchange and the exchange of feeling, lies in the definite char-
acter of the one and the vague, indefinite nature of the other. In the
economic exchange, the values are easily appreciable in numbers, the
obligation is fulfilled by one act of a highly specialized kind. On the
